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Pursuant to Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants/ 
Appellants, Mary Sawyers and KTVX-TV, hereby respectfully submit their 
Reply/Answer Brief. 
I. DR. JENSEN'S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 
IS UNWARRANTED 
In his appellee's brief, Dr. Jensen attempts to distract the Court with 
mischaracterizations of the issues and unsupported claims that appellants have failed to 
adequately marshal the evidence supporting the verdicts. As demonstrated below, the 
appellants have raised three issues that require the Court to decide pure questions of law: 
(1) whether the trial court erred in applying the "catch-all" tort statute of limitations to 
claims for libel (that plaintiff had merely re-labeled claims for "false light invasion of 
privacy"), and thereby permitted the plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations for 
libel;1 (2) whether plaintiffs statutory and common law intrusion claims are legally 
insufficient for failure of plaintiff to show violation of any expectation of privacy that is 
objectively reasonable, and (3) whether plaintiffs "false light" invasion of privacy claim 
Dr. Jensen also asserts that a trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion 
is not reviewable on appeal after a trial. Corrected Br. of Appellee at 24-25. Although 
Dr. Jensen cites numerous authorities from outside this jurisdiction, his counsel 
apparently neglected to review the authorities cited in the appellant's opening brief. See 
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for 
summary judgment on issue of statute of limitations on appeal after completion of jury 
trial). The issue is moot in any event, since the same record that was made on the motion 
for summary judgment was also made at trial. Opening Br. 1-2. 
Dr. Jensen concedes that "most jurisdictions require the court to make an initial 
determination that the [plaintiffs] expectation of seclusion or solitude is 'objectively 
reasonable.'" Corrected Appellee's Br. at 30 n.9. 
1 
fails for the same reason. Because three of the six questions presented by this appeal 
require this Court to resolve pure questions of law, there is no basis for affirmance on 
grounds of failure to marshal the evidence. 
Defendants have also raised three issues that do call upon the Court to assess the 
sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury verdicts: (1) the defendants' broadcasts 
are "substantially true" and therefore not actionable as libel or false light publicity, 
(2) there is no competent evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff suffered any economic 
losses that were proximately caused by the allegedly false statements contained in the 
defendants' third broadcast, and (3) there is no clear and convincing evidence of "actual 
malice" necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages, and As to each of these 
issues the defendants readily concede that they bear the burden of marshalling the 
evidence in support of the verdicts below. However, as demonstrated in the remainder of 
this brief, the plaintiffs Response does not point to any material evidence in support of 
any of these verdicts that was not cited by the defendants in their Opening Brief. 
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING LIBEL CLAIMS 
MUST APPLY TO ALL LIBEL CLAIMS 
THAT ARE SIMPLY RE-LABELED "FALSE LIGHT" 
Dr. Jensen asserts that the "catch-all" statute of limitations for "torts having 
nowhere else been provided for in this statute" should apply to his re-labeled libel claims. 
Corrected Appellee's Br. at 5. Dr. Jensen does not (and cannot) dispute that it was not 
until after the defendants moved to dismiss his libel claims on the first two broadcasts as 
untimely filed that he filed an Amended Complaint that simply re-labeled those claims 
"false light invasion of privacy." See Opening Br. at 5, 25. Ignoring this Court's 
2 
footnote in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 n.37 (Utah 1992), 
which stated that "a false light invasion of privacy claim based on defamatory statements 
[is] governed by the statute of limitations for libel," Dr. Jensen cites authorities 
(including unreported decisions) from other jurisdictions that have applied a longer 
statute of limitations to an invasion of privacy claim.3 Corrected Appellee's Br. at 26. 
Of course, none of the still valid cases he has cited are binding on this Court, and the 
Court should adhere to the rule it embraced in Russell, supra. Moreover, were the Court 
to indulge Dr. Jensen's legerdemain in relabeling a "libel claim" as one for "false light" 
here - in a case that pertains to his business and professional conduct and reputation 
(from which claims for emotional distress are derivative) and not his private life affairs -
that would send a clear signal to all future plaintiffs that the Utah statute of limitations for 
libel is meaningless. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo. 
1986) (under facts remarkably similar to those of the present case, the Court noted that "if 
the defamation statute of limitations is not applied, such a statute would become 
meaningless because parties will invariably claim a 'false light' invasion of privacy 
instead of a defamation."). 
3
 Indeed, the two Kansas authorities cited by Dr. Jensen have been disavowed by 
Kansas' Court of Appeals. See Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln Cty. Conservation 
Dist, 31 P.3d 970, 974-75 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that false light invasion of 
privacy claim, as well as all other "misrepresentation-based claims" that arise from the 
same publication "are essentially allegations of defamation, and all are similarly time-
barred" under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation). Similarly, the 
unreported United States District Court for the District of Oregon decision Dr. Jensen 
cites has also been rejected by Oregon's Court of Appeals. See Magenis v. Fisher 
Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). 
3 
Dr. Jensen argues that the Court of Appeals' analysis in Hodges v. Howell, 4 P.3d 
803 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), is dispositive. Dr. Jensen's reliance upon Hodges is 
completely misplaced. In Hodges, the Court of Appeals concluded that the elements and 
"basic nature of the alleged violation of the plaintiffs right" of a claim for alienation of 
affections are "not sufficiently related" to the elements and basic nature of the alleged 
violation of the plaintiffs right in a claim for seduction that the statute of limitations for 
seduction should govern both actions. Id. at 806-07. The Court of Appeals concluded 
that comparing the claims of "alienation of affection" and "seduction" was akin to 
comparing apples and oranges: "Indeed, the two torts do not even share an identity of 
plaintiffs and defendants." Id. at 806. 
Here, even though the two causes of action that Dr. Jensen sequentially pleaded 
(based upon the identical set of facts) are at least nominally distinct legal claims, they 
cannot be characterized as "not sufficiently related" to have the same statute of 
limitations apply.4 Where, as here, both claims are based upon the purported falsity of 
statements concerning the plaintiffs business and professional conduct and not his 
personal or private affairs, the distinction between the two is entirely ephemeral. While it 
is true that this Court has recognized "false light" and "libel" as distinct causes of action, 
that fact alone does not resolve the issue of which statute of limitations should apply. 
When the Tennessee Supreme Court, like this Court, recognized "false light invasion of 
Indeed, Colorado's Supreme Court recently decided that the claims of false light 
and libel were so closely related that there was no need to recognize a separate claim for 
false light under that state's common law. See Denver Publ g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 
(Colo. 2002). 
4 
privacy" as a cognizable claim independent of the claim for libel, it determined that the 
two claims were sufficiently related to one another that "application of different statutes 
of limitation for false light and defamation cases could undermine the effectiveness of 
limitation on defamation claims." West v. Media General Convergence, 53 S.W.3d 640, 
648 (Tenn. 2001); see also authorities cited in Opening Br. at 24-25. Notably, the 
authoritative RESTATEMENT OF TORTS states that a plaintiff asserting both libel and false 
light claims premised on the same publication is entitled to recover on only one of the 
two closely related claims, not both. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652E cmt. b 
(1977). 
A much more analogous case to the present one than Hodges is this Court's 
decision in Tollman v. K-Mart Enters, of Utah, Inc., 560 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977), which is 
cited by the Court of Appeals in Hodges. In Tollman, this Court held that the same 
statute of limitations at issue in this case, § 78-12-29(4), applied to a claim for "false 
arrest," even though "false arrest" is not among the tort claims listed in the statute. This 
Court concluded that the claim of "false imprisonment," which is contained in the statute, 
is sufficiently related in nature to the claim of "false arrest" that the one-year statute of 
limitations should apply: "Variance in nomenclature does not change the essential nature 
of the wrong." 560 P.2d at 1128. Thus, to determine the appropriate statute of 
limitations, the Court must look "to the basic nature of the alleged violation of the 
plaintiffs right" irrespective of what label a plaintiff attaches to his claim. Most 
tellingly, for purposes of deciding the present controversy, the Court recognized "the fact 
that Sec. 78-12-29(4) U.C.A appears to cover [all of] the various invasions of 
5 
personal liberty." Id. In words that apply equally well to the present case, the Court 
concluded "it would be quite illogical to suppose that all other invasions of personal 
liberty were limited to one year by that Section, but there was a separate, but 
unmentioned, tort of 'false arrest' which should have a four-year statute of limitations 
governed by the 'catch-all5 Section 78-12-25(2) U.C.A." Id. Accordingly, under this 
Court's own precedent of Tollman and the numerous authorities set forth in appellants' 
Opening Brief at 24-25, the Court must find that the one-year statute of limitations 
applies to Dr. Jensen's untimely libel claims that he merely re-labeled as claims for "false 
light." 
III. DR. JENSEN HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED 
HE HAD AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES 
At page 28 of his Corrected Appellee's Brief, Dr. Jensen asserts that there are four 
prongs to an intrusion claim.5 Dr. Jensen claims all of these issues present questions of 
fact for the jury, but he is plainly mistaken: Prong 3 "whether Dr. Jensen had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as a state-licensed and regulated physician" (which is 
essentially the same question posed by prong 1), presents a question of law for the court. 
See infra at 7-11. In fact, the question presented in prong 3 is the only issue the Court 
needs to resolve in order to reverse all of Dr. Jensen's claims labeled "invasion of 
privacy," whether common law intrusion, statutory violations (which require 
unauthorized recording "in a private place"), or false light "invasion of privacy." For all 
His prong 4 concerns substantial truth, which is a defense to defamation and 
false light, but plays no role in a claim for intrusion. 
6 
such claims, the threshold question - one of law for the court to decide - is whether Dr. 
Jensen had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his conduct of his 
professionally licensed medical care rendered in the confines of a commercial business 
establishment. If this Court answers that question in the negative, as defendants maintain 
it should, then none of Dr. Jensen's claims for violation of his right to privacy can be 
sustained. 
It is well settled that the tort of intrusion upon solitude or seclusion requires an 
intentional invasion into an aspect of the plaintiffs personal life in which he has both a 
subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. See Medical Lab. 
Mgmt. Consultants v. American Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citations omitted); see also Corrected Appellee's Br. at 30 n.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
TORTS § 652B cmt. c at 379; W. Page Keeton, et al , PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 
117 at 855 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he thing into which there is an intrusion or prying must be, 
and be entitled to be, private.") (emphasis added). It is equally well settled that the 
question whether a person's expectation of privacy in a particular set of circumstance was 
an objectively reasonable one is a question of law, for the court. See, e.g., Opening Br. 
26-28 (citing authorities); see also State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1983) {per 
curiam). 
Dr. Jensen's reliance upon Sanders v. American Broadcasting Company is 
unavailing because Utah's statutes, unlike California's, do not require all parties to 
consent to the recording of a conversation. See Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306 
F.3d at 815-16 (expressly distinguishing Sanders and Shulman decisions because 
7 
California's Invasion of Privacy Act prohibits electronic recording of any "confidential 
communication" without the consent of all parties to the communication). Utah's law, 
like Arizona's law at issue in the Medical Lab, Consultants case, "reflects a policy 
decision by the state that the secret recording of a private conversation by a party to that 
conversation does not violate another party's right to privacy." Id, at 816. More 
tellingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if it assumed Arizona would follow 
California's unique approach to recognizing "limited privacy" (which protects against 
unconsented recording of one's conversation), it would not find a violation in cases such 
as Dr. Jensen's interaction with Mary Sawyers, in which no personal and intimate 
details of Dr. Jensen's life were recorded by the defendants: "Protection for privacy 
interests generally apply only to private matters." Id, at 816 (citation omitted)6; see also 
Wilkins v. National Broad, Co,, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 1999) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendants on intrusion claim premised upon surreptitious 
recording of a meeting where recorded conversation did not capture any of the plaintiffs' 
"personal lives, intimate relationships, or any other private affairs"); Desnick v. American 
Broad, Co,, 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for 
media defendants on intrusion claim where undercover reporters "videotaped physicians 
engaged in professional, not personal communications with strangers (the testers 
6
 See also W. Page Keeton, et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 117 at 854 
(intrusion requires "intentional interference with another's . . . private affairs and 
concerns.") (emphasis added); Sullivan v, Pulitzer Broad, Co,, 709 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. 
1986) (Blackmar, J., concurring) (in a false light case, where allegations concerning the 
plaintiff "are proper matters of public concern, [they are charges] to which the plaintiff 
has no right to privacy."). 
8 
themselves),... there was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers 
recorded their own conversations with the Desnick Eye Center's physicians."). 
Similarly, Dr. Jensen's reliance upon the Dietemann and Copeland decisions is 
unavailing because both cases involved surreptitious recording inside the uniquely private 
setting of the plaintiffs' homes, not while plaintiffs (as here) were rendering state-
o 
licensed professional services in a commercial business office setting. See Desnick, 44 
F.3d at 1352-53 (distinguishing Dietemann from case where undercover reporters 
surreptitiously recorded licensed doctors' professional interactions in a commercial office 
setting). Dr. Jensen's attempt to distinguish two cases cited by the defendants is also 
unavailing: (1) Dr. Jensen brushes aside Washington Post v. United States Dep 't of 
Justice, 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988), as a supposedly inapposite FOIA case. Of course, 
Exemption (7)(C) of the FOIA authorizes nondisclosure of information which would 
constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Courts interpreting that 
language have held that it does not apply to "information relating to business judgments 
and relationships . . . even if disclosure might tarnish someone's professional reputation." 
Id. at 100. (2) Dr. Jensen dismisses New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), as a 
purportedly inapposite Fourth Amendment case. Of course, for there to be a violation of 
Shulman and Sanders are also distinguishable because in both cases the 
defendants recorded intimate details of the plaintiffs' personal and private lives. 
Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (recognizing clear distinction 
between expectations of privacy outside and inside one's home: "In the home, our cases 
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying . . . 
eyes."). 
9 
one's Fourth Amendment rights through a warrantless search, the court must also find (as 
in an intrusion claim) that the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the areas searched. See State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1983) (per 
curiam); see also Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9 Cir. 
1990) (holding that plaintiff doctor had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
medical treatment of undercover patients who recorded their interaction with the 
plaintiff). 
Most tellingly (in fact, dispositively), Dr. Jensen devotes none of his response 
brief to attempting to distinguish or explain the four pivotal cases of (1) Desnick, (2) 
Medical Labs Consultants, (3) Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9 
Cir. 1990), and (4) Commonwealth v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1998), each of 
which holds that professionally licensed doctors have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the conduct of their professional medical care conducted in the confines of 
commercial business settings. In all four of these factually indistinguishable cases, the 
courts found no violation of any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when third 
parties (posing as patients) surreptitiously recorded licensed physicians' professional 
interactions with them. Dr. Jensen only mentions, but does not address Medical Labs. 
Consultants', the other three cases are not even cited in Dr. Jensen's 50-page brief. Dr. 
Jensen's failure to even acknowledge these persuasive leading precedents betrays his 
9
 See also 2 Dobbs, Law of Torts § 426 at 1201 (2002) (noting that conduct of 
private parties that constitutes tort of intrusion can constitute Fourth Amendment 
violation when committed by governmental actors). 
10 
inability to refute the weight of those authorities, which show as a matter of law that a 
state-licensed medical professional has no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy11 
in providing professional medical services to patients within a business establishment. 
Accordingly, none of Dr. Jensen's claims for "invasion of privacy" (including intrusion 
and false light "invasion of privacy"12) can, as a matter of law, be sustained. 
IV. THE ALLEGED FALSITY OR "FICTIONALIZATION" 
OF DEFENDANTS' BROADCAST CANNOT, BY ITSELF, 
CONSTITUTE AN "INVASION OF PRIVACY" 
IF THE BROADCASTS FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY 
ON PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Dr. Jensen cites Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), to support his assertion 
that a medical professional has a claim for "invasion of privacy" premised on a report 
focused exclusively on his professional conduct, "when the reported material contains 
falsehoods." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 32. However, Time, Inc. v. Hill is not a case 
involving the "false light invasion of privacy" tort; the case arose under New York's civil 
rights statutes §§ 50, 51, which authorizes recovery for an unauthorized exploitation of an 
individual's commercially marketable public persona. See Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr 
Printing, 94 N.Y.2d 436, 441 (2000) ("[R]ecognizing the legislature's pointed objective 
10
 Of course, Dr. Jensen cannot now address those cases in his Reply Brief in 
support of his cross-appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(g). 
To be objectively reasonable, an expectation of privacy must be "one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d at 591. 
"In order to be actionable, an action for false light [invasion of privacy] must 
involve the private affairs of the subject, and cannot relate to any matter which is 
inherently 'public' or 'of legitimate interest to the public.'" 62A AM. JUR. 2D, Privacy 
11 
in enacting sections 50 and 51, we have underscored that the statute is to be narrowly 
construed and 'strictly limited5 to the non-consensual commercial appropriations of the 
name, portrait or picture of a living person.") (citing Finger v. Omni Pubis. Int'l, 77 
N.Y.2d 128, 141 (1990)); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 125 
(1993); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440 (1982) (stating that New 
York's statute and common law do not recognize a claim for "false light invasion of 
privacy"). In essence, the claim at issue under New York law in Time, Inc. v. Hill is 
accurately described as one for "misappropriation of a plaintiff s name, persona, image, 
or likeness for commercial advantage," which the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION correctly recognizes as a commercial tort, not an invasion of 
personal privacy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1994). 
Dr. Jensen did not (and cannot) claim that the defendants improperly misappropriated his 
name, persona, image, or likeness for their commercial advantage; instead, he pleaded a 
claim for the invasion of his personal privacy. Thus, Dr. Jensen's argument simply 
ignores the long line of cases cited in Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-28, 34-36 that hold 
that certain aspects of a plaintiff s life - e.g., one's discharge of his official or 
professional duties - cannot, as a matter of law, give rise to a claim for "invasion of 
privacy" irrespective of the truth of falsity of the broadcast. Accordingly, Dr. Jensen's 
"invasion of privacy" (false light) claims must fail, as a matter of law. 
§ 126 at 734-35. See Russell, 842 P.2d at 902 ("Allegations of misconduct against a local 
doctor . . . are certainly matters of public concern.. . ."). 
12 
V. DR. JENSEN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS5 PUBLISHED STATEMENTS 
ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE 
Dr. Jensen is correct that the question whether allegedly defamatory statements are 
substantially true is generally a jury question, but it is also a question that the defendants 
argued in their motions for summary judgment, for a directed verdict, and for JNOV. See 
Opening Br. at 2. This Court therefore reviews those rulings for correctness (of course, 
while looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Furthermore, 
the Court must determine whether the published statements were substantially true by 
exercising the Court's own "independent appellate review." Opening Br. at 2-3. On this 
issue, Dr. Jensen's primary response is his claim that the defendants failed to sufficiently 
marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. Corrected Appellee's Br. at 22-24. 
Not only is this assertion without merit,13 Dr. Jensen has himself failed to acknowledge or 
respond to the evidence cited in the Appellants' Opening Brief that demonstrates the 
Dr. Jensen's assertion that the defendants/appellants failed to cite numerous 
facts in support of the falsity of published statements concerning his treatment of Mary 
Sawyers is demonstrably erroneous. The appellants did cite to the evidence that Dr. 
Jensen claims is relevant: (a) Jensen believed, based on Sawyers' alleged representation 
to his receptionist, that she was desperate to lose weight or she would lose her job, 
Opening Br. at 9 n.2; (b) Jensen's medical assistant did take Sawyers' blood pressure and 
recorded it on an intake form, id. at 11, 20; (c) Sawyers filled out a medical history form 
prior to meeting with Dr. Jensen, id. at 11 n.4, 47; (d) during her office visit with him, Dr. 
Jensen indicated that "maybe" he'd prescribe Dexedrine if Fen-Phen did not work out of 
her, id. at 12, 46; (e) that Dr. Jensen claimed at trial that he intended to conduct a 
thorough physical examination of Ms. Sawyers but was prohibited from doing so when 
she abruptly left the examination room, id. at 12, 47; (f) that prior to the defendants' first 
broadcast, Dr. Jensen told Sawyers he had reconsidered his earlier statements in which he 
had indicated a willingness to prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss, id. at 15-16, 46, 49; 
(g) the second broadcast stated that DOPL was "going after" Jensen's license, id. at 49. 
13 
substantial truth of the gist of the defendants' broadcast - that Dr. Jensen prescribed 
controlled substance weight loss medications ("Fen-Phen") to patients without first 
conducting any meaningful physical examination or medical history as required by state 
law. Once again, what is most telling about Dr. Jensen's brief is that he has completely 
ignored the undisputed facts cited in the appellants' brief: that on the same day that Dr. 
Jensen wrote out the Fen-Phen prescription for Mary Sawyers, he also wrote the same 
prescription for his nurse practitioner Sandra Peterson-Katour without conducting any 
physical examination or obtaining any medical history from her. See Opening Br. at 14.H 
Thus, the question raised on appeal is whether these undisputed facts - that Dr. Jensen 
prescribed controlled substances to Peterson-Katour without performing a medical 
examination of any kind - renders the defendants' published statements concerning his 
similar conduct with Mary Sawyers substantially true. See Opening Br. at 38-40. By not 
disputing that this incident occurred, nor contending that it differed in any material way 
from what was depicted in the broadcast, Dr. Jensen effectively concedes that the gist of 
the defendants' broadcast - that on one occasion he prescribed controlled substances for 
weight loss without conducting legally adequate medical evaluations - was substantially 
true. 
Dr. Jensen did not dispute these facts, but only disputed Peterson's further 
testimony that at that same time, Jensen also gave her a second Fen-Phen prescription for 
Peterson's mother, without ever seeing her or knowing anything about her health or 
medical history. R. 6867 (Katour) at 18-19, 23-24; R. 6856 (Jensen) at 18. 
14 
VI. DR. JENSEN HAS FAILED TO (AND CANNOT) POINT TO ANY 
EVIDENCE PROVING THAT HE SUFFERED ECONOMIC LOSSES 
THAT WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
BY THE DEFENDANTS9 THIRD BROADCAST 
Once again, Dr. Jensen derides the defendants for allegedly having failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of economic losses he claims were proximately caused 
by the defendants' third broadcast. Corrected Appellee's Brief at 38 -39. However, Dr. 
Jensen is unable, either in this section of his brief or in his statement of facts, to point to 
any record evidence demonstrating he suffered any economic losses as a proximate result 
of the defendants' third broadcast. Instead, Dr. Jensen points only to his own bald and 
unsupported claim, during his own testimony at trial, that he was "financially damaged 
by these broadcasts." See R. 6866 (Jensen) at 104.15 Defendants can hardly be faulted 
for having omitted such a hollow and unsupported assertion - without any demonstrable 
proof offered in support of that assertion - as a failure to "marshal the evidence" that 
would support of the jury's verdict. 
Dr. Jensen also cites to his own unsupported assertion at trial that he unilaterally 
quit his job at the Art City Family Medical Center because "he understood that his 
employer cut back his hours and would fire him." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 40 
(emphasis added). However, Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence at trial 
demonstrating that his own "understanding" that he'd be fired if he did not quit his job 
During his testimony, Dr. Jensen also claimed that he was "incredibly injured" 
by all three broadcasts. See R. 6866 (Jensen) at 118-19. But even this unsupported 
conclusory assertion does not even claim, much less prove, that he suffered any financial 
losses as a result of any of the broadcasts. 
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was well-founded or that any of his superiors ever informed him that he was to be 
terminated16 (or, most importantly, that any such alleged employment decision was 
triggered by the defendants' third broadcast). Indeed, Dr. Jensen testified that it was his 
"understanding" that he'd be fired only "if the newscasts continued" in the future, after 
the third broadcast, and not as a result of it. See R. 6866 (Jensen) at 98: 14-16. 
Moreover, the director of that clinic, Michael Rosen, testified that the management of that 
clinic had specifically decided not to terminate Dr. Jensen after the first of the 
defendants' broadcasts (which was the only time any of Dr. Jensen's patients expressed 
an unwillingness to be treated by him). R. 6848 (Rosen) at 88: 4-12. And Rosen testified 
that Dr. Jensen's employment at the clinic ended solely as a result of Dr. Jensen's own 
voluntary action. Id. at 118:1-6. Thus, Dr. Jensen did not offer any competent evidence 
demonstrating that any adverse employment action that he claims he expected to be taken 
against him was attributable to his employer's response to the defendants' third 
broadcast. In other words, the "proof he points to is, in reality, no proof at all, but pure 
speculation and conjecture on his part. See Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & 
Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978) (award of damages "cannot properly be based 
on speculation and conjecture" . . . the plaintiff must establish, through competent 
evidence, that he "suffered injury and damage and also that it was proximately caused by 
the negligence of the defendant"); Gould v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 309 P.2d 
16
 Indeed, Dr. Jensen corrected himself to make clear he was not so notified, when 
he began his statement "They told me - or it was my understanding . . . " R. 6866 
(Jensen) at 98: 15. 
16 
802, 806 (Utah 1957) ("The award for loss of prospective profits by the jury on the 
present state of proof is clearly the result of speculation and conjecture."). 
Dr. Jensen also points to his testimony that on one occasion a single lady patient 
was waiting to see him, recognized him, and said "I will not see Dr. Jensen." R. 6866 
(Jensen) at 43. What Dr. Jensen omits from his brief is the fact that this single instance of 
a "lost customer" occurred shortly after (and as a result of) the defendants' first 
broadcast, long before the third story was broadcast. R. 6866 (Jensen) at 43: 16-17 
1 7 
(indicating that the incident occurred "within the first month after the first broadcast"). 
Thus, as a matter of law, Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence of economic losses he 
suffered that were proximately caused by the defendants' third broadcast. See Gould, 
309 P.2d at 806 ("Plaintiff has not shown a single instance of the loss of prospective 
business caused by the defendant's breach, and any award for loss of prospective profits 
must necessarily be based upon speculation and conjecture.") (emphasis added). 
Finally, Dr. Jensen asserts that two of his expert witnesses on damages, Dr. Frank 
Stuart and L. Deane Smith, both testified as to the amount of economic losses that Dr. 
Jensen suffered as a result of the defendants' broadcasts. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 
40. In fact, both of these witnesses testified that Dr. Jensen's economic losses all flowed 
from his loss of coverage by IHC health plans, which occurred in September 1995, more 
than one full year prior to the defendants' third broadcasts. See Appellants' Opening Br. 
In his brief, Dr. Jensen erroneously asserts that the incident occurred "after the 
third broadcast." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 40. Dr. Jensen also testified that a similar 
incident had occurred "directly after the second broadcast," R. 6866 at 44: 18-21, but 
never offered any evidence of lost patients resulting from the third broadcast. 
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at 40-42 (summarizing and providing record citations for Stuart's and Smith's trial 
testimony). In his Response Brief, Dr. Jensen does not cite to any testimony from these 
witnesses (or any other witnesses) purporting to establish a causal link between the 
defendants' third broadcast and any economic losses thereafter purportedly suffered by 
Dr. Jensen. 
In sum, it is clear that the defendants met their burden of attempting to marshal 
any and all evidence in support of the verdict. Moreover, in his Response Brief, Dr. 
Jensen has failed to meet his burden of citing any evidence in the record that actually 
demonstrated that defendants' third broadcast was the proximate cause of economic 
losses he suffered thereafter. Accordingly, the Court must vacate the jury's award of 
$ 1,000,000 in economic damages that were premised upon the third broadcast. 
VII. DR. JENSEN HAS NOT POINTED TO ANY EVIDENCE 
THAT WOULD PERMIT THIS COURT 
TO FIND CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF 
THAT DEFENDANTS PUBLISHED WITH ACTUAL MALICE18 
Dr. Jensen erroneously asserts that only common law malice is required for 
punitive damages. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 43. Here, Dr. Jensen confuses the 
standard of fault for liability in a private figure case (which is negligence), and the 
standard of fault required to impose punitive damages upon a media defendant in a 
private figure case where the publication is on a matter of public concern. See MUJI 
Inexplicably, Dr. Jensen devotes two pages of his brief to argue that neither the 
public interest nor fair reports privilege applies to the defendants' broadcasts. See 
Corrected Appellee's Br. at 41-42. However, the Court will search in vain the 
defendants' Opening Brief for any argument by appellants asserting those privileges on 
appeal. 
18 
10.12 (requiring constitutional "actual malice" for imposition of punitive damages); see 
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., All U.S. 749, 756 (1985). Not only does Dr. Jensen 
erroneously urge that only common law malice need be established to sustain an award of 
punitive damages, he fails to cite any record evidence that would sustain a finding (by the 
requisite "clear and convincing evidence" standard) of actual malice; instead, Dr. Jensen 
merely states that "the jury found that the evidence satisfied the high public official 
standard for malice," and then argues that "defendants cannot justify their malice by facts 
learned after their actions." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 44.19 Dr. Jensen's cavalier 
reliance upon the jury's verdict on the question of actual malice ignores binding authority 
from the United States Supreme Court holding that the First Amendment requires 
appellate courts to exercise "independent appellate review" of the evidence of actual 
malice. See Opening Br. at 44 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)). 
Here, as demonstrated by the extensive recitation of the record evidence, see Opening Br. 
19
 Dr. Jensen confuses the reason why defendants have cited to the undisputed 
testimony that he prescribed Fen-Phen to Sandra Peterson-Katour without conducting any 
medical examination or medical history. These undisputed facts, although learned by the 
defendants after the broadcasts at issue, are not offered to justify the defendants' state of 
mind at the time of the broadcast, but to demonstrate that the allegations in the broadcasts 
were substantially true. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 
1993) (holding that truthful publications are not actionable, "[a]nd it makes no difference 
that the true facts were unknown until the trial"). 
19 
at 44-37, the record compels the Court's independent conclusion that there was not 
clear and convincing evidence presented below establishing that the defendants published 
their broadcasts knowing them to be false or while entertaining serious subjective doubts 
as to their truth. 
VIIL ANSWER TO ISSUES RAISED 
IN CROSS-APPEAL 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(g), defendants hereby answer the points and 
contentions raised by cross-appellant Dr. Jensen in his Corrected Appellee's Brief. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Declined to Award Reasonable Attorneys' Fees on 
Non-Overlapping Claims. 
Dr. Jensen asserts that he is entitled to attorneys' fees on his non-compensable 
claims (defamation and false light) because, he contends, those claims overlap legally 
and/or factually with his compensable statutory information-gathering claim. Corrected 
Appellee's Br. at 46. 
Prevailing parties may collect attorneys fees on non-compensable claims only 
when those claims substantially overlap with compensable claims. See Keith 
Jorgensen 's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872, 879 (Utah App. 2001). Claims 
are deemed not to overlap if they require proof of different elements and sets of facts. Cf. 
Brown v. DavidK. Richardson Co., Inc., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999). The question 
For the Court's benefit, the appellants have appended to this brief the 
transcripts of the phone conversation between Mary Sawyers and Dr. Jensen, prior to her 
office visit, and of her hidden camera recording of her office visit with Dr. Jensen, to 
further demonstrate that defendants had no reason to doubt the truth of their broadcasts. 
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of whether a party is entitled to attorneys' fees is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court correctly concluded that Dr. Jensen's claims arising from the 
manner in which information was gathered shared neither a common core of facts nor 
related legal theories with his claims for defamation and false light that are based on 
falsity of the content of the broadcasts and defendants' care with respect to truth. See 
R.6779 (Order July 31, 2001) at 5: 1-2. Dr. Jensen's invasion of privacy claims based 
upon newsgathering claims are not "inextricably linked" with, and require different proof 
than, the broadcast-based claims of defamation and false light. Compare R. 6841 Jury 
Instructions Nos. 26-33 with Nos. 40-48. Because the claims did not substantially 
overlap, the trial court was correct in concluding that Dr. Jensen was not entitled to 
attorney's fees on his non-compensable claims. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Attorney Sine's Allocation of Fees 
Was Deficient. 
Dr. Jensen asserts that the District Court erred when it rejected Mr. Sine's request 
for attorney's fees because he failed to properly allocate them. See R. 6776 (Ruling 
September 27, 2001) at 8: 17-18. 
A party who is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees on some claims but not others 
must segregate the time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for which there may 
be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have 
been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for 
which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 
21 
P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). A party who requests an award of attorney fees has the 
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award. See Cottonwood Mall Co., 
830 P.2d at 269-70.21 A trial court's determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Bakowski v. Mountain States 
Steel Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Utah 2002). 
Here, Attorney Sine failed to comply with the allocation requirements, even when 
ordered to do so by the trial court, and instead submitted a list of fees divided into two 
columns. The trial court's conclusion that this submission did not comport with the 
allocation standards was not an abuse of its discretion. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Declined to Award All of Dr, Jensen's Claimed 
Costs. 
1. The defendants complied with Rule 54(d)(2). 
Dr. Jensen asserts that he should be awarded all of his claimed costs because the 
defendants filed an "objection" rather than a "motion" opposing the costs claimed under 
Rule 54(d)(2). See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 46. This Court has repeatedly and 
consistently treated "objections" and "motions" synonymously. See Graco Fishing & 
Rental Tools v. IronwoodExploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1987) (noting 
that "objections to costs must be filed within seven days") (emphasis added); see also 
Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 1978) ("The objection to the cost 
A failure to allocate fees between compensable and non-compensable claims 
"constitutes grounds for complete denial." Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 349 (Utah App. 
2001), cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 
P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). 
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bill was filed by [defendant]") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Dr. Jensen's claim that 
defendants failed to comply with Rule 54(d)(2) should be rejected. 
2. The costs claimed by Dr. Jensen were properly rejected as not being 
"necessary disbursements." 
Dr. Jensen complains that the trial court failed to award him costs that are 
authorized under neither Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) nor this Court's 
precedents. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 47-48. Nevertheless, Dr. Jensen insists that 
he should recover the costs of expert witness fees and equipment, among other expenses, 
because they were "necessary." Id. A trial court's decision to award or deny taxable 
costs will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 
637 (Utah 2000). 
Utah courts have interpreted "costs" recoverable under Rule 54(d) to mean "those 
fees which are 'required to be paid to the court and to witnesses,'" see Lloyd's Unlimited 
v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988), and have 
uniformly distinguished taxable costs from other litigation expenses, regardless of the 
alleged "necessity" of those expenses. See Coleman v. Stevens, 17 P.3d 1122, 1125 
(Utah 2000). As this Court noted in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980), 
and reaffirmed this year in Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 
46 (Utah 2003), "there is a distinction to be understood between legitimate and taxable 
costs and other expenses of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not taxable 
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as costs." The trial court's decision to adhere to the requirements of Utah law and allow 
only those costs authorized by statute and case law was not an abuse of discretion.22 
Nor is Dr. Jensen's assertion that the Frampton ruling violates the Open Courts 
clause of the Utah Constitution well taken. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 48. Dr. 
Jensen asserts that a litigant is deprived of due process of law by the legislature's 
determination that only statutorily-specified costs, rather than all conceivable expenses 
incurred in litigation, may be recovered. See id. Article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that all persons shall have reasonable access to the courts and shall 
enjoy due process of law. See Jensen v. State Tax Comm 'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) 
(concluding that where taxpayers were required to pay, but were unable to pay, as a 
deposit the full amount of taxes assessed, penalties, and interest before seeking judicial 
review, the open courts provision was violated, but noting that when a taxpayer is able to 
pay the deposit, she must do so). In this case, Dr. Jensen "received a hearing with no 
preconditions, obstacles, or other limitations." Burgandy v. State of Utah, 983 P.2d 586, 
589 (Utah App. 1999), cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). The potential that Dr. 
Jensen would have to pay all or some his own costs did not impede or restrict "reasonable 
access" to access the courts in violation of the Utah Constitution. 
Dr. Jensen does not contend that the trial court abused its discretion, but urges 
instead that Frampton was wrongly decided. 
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D. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Three Separate Awards on Dr. 
Jensen's Gathering of Information Claims Were Duplicative. 
Dr. Jensen asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the damage awards on 
the common law intrusion upon seclusion claim was duplicative of the two statutory 
privacy claims. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 48. 
A jury verdict which awards duplicate damages based on the same conduct must 
be vacated. See Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 881 (Utah 1985); Mason v. 
Oklahoma Turnpike Autk, 115 F.3d 1442, 1459 (10th Cir. 1997). The question of 
whether damage awards are duplicative is one of fact, reviewable under the clearly 
erroneous standard. See Mason, 115 F.3d at 1459. 
Here, the trial court determined that all three of Dr. Jensen's three invasion of 
privacy claims arose "under the same operative facts and [sought] identical relief." See 
R. 6781-82. The trial court reasoned that that the additional element of "trespass" found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(a) did not sufficiently distinguish it from Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(b) and the common law privacy claims because all three claims were 
aimed at punishing the same conduct, viz. invasion of privacy by surreptitious recording 
of Dr. Jensen's interaction with Sawyers. 
Indeed, all three of the invasion of privacy (two statutory and one common law) 
claims upon which Dr. Jensen prevailed were premised upon the identical set of facts. 
See R. at fflf 5-22, 23-25. Under these circumstances, the trial court's conclusion does not 
amount to clear error. See Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63 P.3d 686, 699 (Utah 
2002). 
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Jensen v. Sawyers and United Television 
TRANSCRIPT 
TAPE NO. 5 
July ,1995 
Telephone call - Mary Sawyers and Michael Jensen 
Sawyers: Is Michael Jensen there, please? 
Receptionist: He is not. He will be here at 6:00 o'clock. 
Sawyers: Oh, 6:00 tonight? 
Receptionist: Yes. 
Sawyers: Uh. Where would I reach him during the day? 
Receptionist: He works for us from 6 to 8 at night. 
Sawyers: Oh. Only for two hours? Is he busy that whole time? 
Receptionist: Uh. That depends. Did you need to come in, or? 
Sawyers: No. Actually I just need to talk to him. It was more of a 
personal nature. 
Receptionist: Yeah. He'll be here til 6:00. 
Sawyers: Alright. Thank you. 
Receptionist: Uhhuh. Bye. Bye. 
Dial tone. 
Sound of numbers being dialed. 
Sawyers: This is Mary. Hello. Hello. 
Dial tone. 




















This is Mary. 
Yes Mary. Hi, Dr. Jensen. 
Oh, hi. How are you. 
Good. 
Thanks for calling me back. I'm sorry to be bothering you at 
work. I tried a couple of times but that was the only number I 
could find. 
That's okay. That's fine. 
Uh. Geoff Roth, who is our new managing editor. 
Uh huh. 
Told me you might be able to help me. I told him that I have been 
on this diet lately and haven't been able to lose much weight. 
Uhhuh. 
And he said that you prescribed some pills for one of his friends. 
Some, I don't know what they are, some diet pills. 
Uhhuh. 
Could you do that for me? 
Yeah. I probably could. 
Okay. 
So, uh. 
What do you need to know? 




















Is that something you could arrange very easily? 
Uh. Well, I don't know. It depends on my insurance. What kind 
of insurance do you use? 




In fact, I'm probably. That's probably the main insurance that is 
covered through me. 
Do you have another. Are you at another? Do you have your 
own practice besides this uh? 
Uh. Actually I will be in about ten days. I have been —. I have 
had an injury and been hospitalized. 
Uh. 
And, uh, but, uh, actually I'm the guy to talk about weight loss. 
Okay. 
I know a lot about it. I ran the OptiFast program here at Utah 
Valley for about three years and also many physicians are 
reluctant to prescribe prescription diet pills. I really am not. I 
think they work. Laughs. I think they work great. 
Uh huh. 
So,uh. 
What is it that you prescribe? 
Uh. Right now what is used most is Fastin and something 
called Pondimin. 
ers: Uhhuh. 
Jensen: Traditionally what has been used is Dexedrine. Dexedrine 
technically is illegal to, uh, use as a diet pill. Though I, uh, sometimes 
I find people have other disorders that I uh feel comfortable using 
Dexedrine with. 
Sawyers: Uh huh. 
Jensen: All of these medications are related. They are technically 
amphetamines which are speed. 
Sawyers: Uh huh. 
Jensen: Uh. And if used properly I don't find them dangerous or addicting. 
So. 
Sawyers: So Fastin and this other thing are similar? 
Jensen: Yes, they are. 
Sawyers: So, its, its basically like taking speed? 
Jensen: That's correct. 
Sawyers: But you don't think its harmful? 
Jensen: Not, not if it is taken properly. Uh. I suggest patients, uh, take, 
uh, not take a pill one day out of the week and that way they 
don't develop a tolerance to that. Uh. I took Fastin for one 
month, uh, and I took it each day and I went through a withdrawal 
that lasted about a day and a half which was semi unpleasant but 
it wasn't that bad. 
Sawyers: Um. 
Jensen: Uh, but, uh, I don't think these things are highly addictive 
particularly if you, if you kind of give yourself a break one day a 
week. But they really work. 
Sawyers: How, I mean, I don't need to lose a lot of weight. I would, just 
like 10 pounds mainly. 
Jensen: Uh. Then you would be a perfect candidate. Uh. For example, 
I have a friend who just got off a mission who, who is usually a 
really thin, you know, college type girl, and she picked up, oh 
probably an extra 20 pounds on her mission and I have had her 
on, uh actually on Dexedrine for about a month and a half and she 
is down to her ideal weight. And it's, it happened oh over about 
a month a half. Most people lose somewhere between 10 and 20 
pounds a month on these medicines. 
Sawyers: So, is there a time, I mean you can't take them only for a certain 
amount of time. Do they become harmful if you take them for a 
longer period of time? 
Jensen: Uh, not necessarily. Uh. Legally its been. Uh the FDA has uh or 
the DEA, I'm not sure who has made it so that Fastin and 
Pondimin can only be prescribed three months out of the year. 
Uh. So, if somebody had a different disorder, for example, 
attention deficit disorder which is hyperactivity, uh which is seen 
in children, or narcolepsy, people falling asleep at the wheel or just 
difficulty with staying awake, uh, I'll prescribe longer than that. 
But, as a physician, you really got to be able to document uh why 
you are prescribing these things. Because, they, they are actually 
class two substances which are the highest controlled substance 
there is. 
Sawyers: So, you can't prescribe them for longer than that amount of time 
if you are prescribing them for somebody to lose weight? 
Jensen: That's right. Now one thing I haven't checked out uh is there are 
about five different kinds of these medications on the market and 
whether you can go from one to the other. And I can give a 
pharmacist a call and uh do that. But if you only want to lose 10 






I can tell you right now. 
So, you think I could do that in how long? 
I think you could do it in one month. 















And you think that I could keep it off? 
Uh. I have found that people that go on these medications, what 
it does is suppresses your appetite so much that you don't even 
want to eat and, uh, during that time period basically you develop 
a regimen that you get used to and, uh, and if it is properly done, 
yes, you keep the weight off. 
So, I thought Geoff said that you prescribed some for his friend. 
You ~. Is she a patient of yours? I mean, I need to come in for 
a visit? 
Yes. Actually these medications because they are so highly 
controlled, it is something that I can't even call in. I have to write 
it out. 
Uhhuh. 
On a script. So, uh. 
So she's a patient of yours too? 
Yeah. I'm not sure who, who we are, who we are talking about. 
It was some party. He just said uh I met this doctor at a party. 
I think his friend's named Lisa and he said uh that he was either 
told or he was there when you, you know, prescribed some diet 
pills and he says, I don't know, you know, what if he could 
prescribe them to you over the phone. 
Yeah. I know who that is then. Uh5 it was Lisa Johnson who 
wrote How to Date a Millionaire, 
Oh. 
Laughter. So, uh. 
So, she's one of your patients, too? 
Jensen: Uh. She's actually a longtime friend of mine. Ijust happened to 

















But you couldn't prescribe then for me without coming in? 
Uh. I really prefer, uh, it would be considered very bad medicine 
for me to prescribe an amphetamine over the phone. Even, you 
know, I realize it would be inconvenient for you. 
Right. I could probably. 
I think it would be worth it for you. 
Okay. So, you know, would it be better then if I come to your 
practice? I mean, or. 
Uh. You, what would probably, and I don't know what your work 
hours are and stuff like that but presently I am working just from 
6:00 to 8:00 nearly every day. 
Uhhuh. 
At this clinic that you called. Uh, I will be starting at my new 
practice next week and will be working uh Thursday, Friday and 
Monday. 
Uhhuh. 
And just depending. Those will be regular hours. Those are like 
9 to 5 hours when these others are —. Uh. I am also working a 
12 hour day Thursday at this clinic. 
Uhhuh. 
And that will be from 8 to 8. 
Okay, but you're down, that's down south, isn't it, where? 
Yes. 
Where are you at? 
Yes. Uh. The clinic that you called is actually called First Med 
and it is on 8th North in Orem. That's the same road the Osmond 
Studio is on. 
Sawyers: Okay. Let me do this. Let me look at my, because I am getting 
ready for a series here, let me look at my schedule and then see 
when I could get in. Uh, and then, uh, just call and make an 
appointment at this 224 number? 
Jensen: Um. I think that would be probably best for you. 
Sawyers: Okay. I need to see . . . 
Jensen: I am making a transition right now and you will find me hard to 
get besides at this clinic. 
Sawyers: Uh huh. I'll see if I can get, I need to see if I can get a referral 
from my primary care physician too. 
Jensen: Okay. 
Sawyers: I'll do that and then I'll give you a call back. 
Jensen: Okay. Great 
Sawyers: Okay. Thank's a lot. 
Jensen: Bye. 
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I'm Dr. Jensen. 
I'm Mary Sawyers. 
(Pause in tape). 
Knock on door. 
Hello. I'm Dr. Jensen. 
I'm Mary Sawyers. We talked on the phone. Nice to meet you . 
Well . 
So, tha t ' s wha t you did to you? 
Sawyers: 
Yeah. I broke my achilles tendon right in half so. Uh. Mary, is 
there a certain thing that you know, have heard of, or whatever 
that you w a n t to do with this or do you wan t me to just school 
you on wha t ' s available? 
I just wan t the safest, easiest way to lose weight . 
Okay. Uh. Let me tell you what the current thinking is right now. 
Uh. What is used and these are technically appetite suppressants, 
but they ' re related to uh speed, which is an amphetamine, and 
they really suppress your appetite. I have taken it before and I'm 
pretty lean and I lose weight Taking stuff iike mat . Uh. Dexednne 
uh and Ritalin are two things that. Most people have heard o f 
Ritalin. 





Jensen: Uh huh. And these medications are sister drugs to those. The 
ones that are approved for weight loss right now are Fastin and 
currently one thing that is sort or the vogue thing right now is to 
use Fastin and Pondimin which they are t w o sister drugs, but 
Fastin is a long acting medication you take one t ime a day. 
Pondimin people wil l take three t imes a day just before meals. 
Pondimin is a little unusual in that it is supposed to be a stimulant 
but when taken wi th Fastin it actually uh suppresses. You are 
kind of hyperactive affects. 
Sawyers: So, they take them together. 
Jensen: What you . Yes, you do. And I, and I haven' t done it, I'm just 
familiar w i th it. This is what you wi l l read in. Apparent ly there is 
a Readers Digest article recently. But a lot of people wi l l , are 
talking about it. And its something that 's been recently quite 
publicized as being highly effective. Now, if you are a person that 
has relatively good control and just needs a little bit of a push, I 
wou ld suggest just going on Fastin. I could give you an additional 
prescription for Pondimin if you want if things are not work ing. 
Sawyers: 
Jensen: 
Try one and then see. 
Uh huh. I think you can increase or double or triple your chances 
of side effects if you take both of them at once. One of our 
nurses in the clinic was doing that and it just d idn ' t work. She 
d idn ' t feel r ight. Now, I have taken Fastin before and uh I feel 
okay. I don ' t know if you are much of a caffeine user but I think 
you get similar side effects as caffeine using Fastin. Okay. Uh. 
If Fastin d idn ' t work for you, I would be wil l ing to work wi th you 




For weight loss? 
Right. Dexedrine is used for attention deficit disorder. In other 
words maintaining concentration. I took Ritalin for my boards. 
You can concentrate . . . 
One, t w o , three four. (Other background voices). 
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Jensen: The other one is narcolepsy. People fall asleep at the wheel. So 
















I have quite a few adults with attention deficit disorder 
(background voice) on Dexedrine and I haven't run into a problem 
once with drug addiction. 
So, what, do you just put down attention deficit disorder? 
I usually, usually put narcolepsy in an adult. We all deal with 
fatigue and tiredness, and you can just say I am tired. 
But the Dexedrine you wouldn't suggest before I tried the other 
stuff. 
Uh. Going with Fastin is in essence a cleaner way. Its approved 
for weight loss. Its a sister drug to Dexedrine and, uh. 
Is it speed as well? 
Uh huh. 
So, which is an amphetamine, right? 
Yes. They are all amphetamines. 
So, are they the same things that you buy like in the store, just. 
Not technically. The ones that you buy in the store are actually 
sort of a hybrid. They're, the caffeine is in a group in and of itself 
and they are more related to caffeine. Uh. 
These are just more powerful? 
Considerably. I would say five to ten times more powerful. 





Uh. I suggest that people not take one once a week. Uh. I took 
Fastin for a month once and then just stopped and I wen t through 
some withdrawals for about a day and a half. I d idn' t feel good. 
Uh. But it d idn ' t last very long. But there was no question that. 
And one thing that you' l l f ind, you probably, wel l , uh, you almost 
certainly lead a really rigorous life style and. 
I never know when I'm going to be work ing. 
Yeah. And i t 's tempting for somebody w i th that , you know, kind 




You' l l have tremendous energy when you take these. So, which 
is great. 
Sawyers: So if I have to stay up all night and cut a series. That 's w h y I was 
down here. I was down in Springville shoot ing for a child abuse 
series. 
Jensen: Uh. Uh. But that 's what I would suggest. I wil l wr i te you a 
prescription for Fastin and the other thing I like about this is I can 
give you two refills wi th each of these. I am giving you a three 
month supply right now. Dexedrine I can ' t do that w i t h . I have 




Okay. But, uh , like I said, if this isn't work ing for you , uh, I'll 
work wi th you a little bit and wi th other th ings. Uh. Is there 
anything as far as eating, things like that? 
Sawyers: 
Jensen: 
I like it. Laughs. 
Okay. Uh. What we ' l l . There are other things you can do. Uh. 
Medically I think we have big armament for weight loss right now 
that we d idn ' t have in the past. 
Sawyers: I read about something or I heard something on the air today 
about rats and its a new drug they are injecting in rats for obesity. 




Jensen: It seems funny people often hear these things before I do. So. 
Sawyers: Well, it is something that they are injecting into rats and they were 
losing like thirty percent of their body weight. 
Jensen: Oh, really. I'm not sure. Well, uh, where was it listed? Where 
did you find your information? 
Sawyers: Uh, National Public Radio. On the radio. 
Jensen: So, the radio. 
Sawyers: I think it came out of Science, one of those journals. 
Jensen: Hum. Yes, Science is kind of a lay journal. It is not really a 
medical journal, but, its like Popular Mechanics. But hold on. 
Sawyers: So, then once you lose, you've lost your desired weight, then you 
can, I mean, what, does it suppress your appetite even after that? 
Jensen: What it does, uh. You don't want to eat. You actually have to 
think, I mean, you eat, you know, just to stay healthy. And by 
the time you reach the three month period, and you may choose 
to go on, on an interval where you don't take it for a month in 
between. But you will have the prescription on hand. Uh. But 
this is the time to actually uh have eating habits and form patterns 
that are lasting. Okay. I'll go over some of those. 
Sawyers: This is real interesting. Really. I mean I, you hear about all these 
weight loss programs. I went on Jenny Craig last year. 
Jensen: Uh huh. 
Sawyers: I lost some weight but I started to gain most of it back. If these 
work, maybe I should. Didn't you say that you helped a woman 
lose like thirty pounds, or some BYU person. 
Jensen: Oh, yeah. Yeah. 
Sawyers: Sounds like an interesting story. If they work, I should do a story. 
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Jensen: Uh. But someone like you is a perfect candidate for this. Okay. 
Uh. People can lose somewhere between ten and twenty pounds 
a month and, you know, you can get really lean with this. And, 
uh. 
Sawyers: Can you lose too much weight, though? I mean, not that I would 
be worried about, you know, I mean, I think I. 
Jensen: Well, you could be if you were thinking in anorexic ways. But 
probably not. 
Sawyers: You just stop taking them when you get to your correct weight. 
Jensen: Yeah. Uh. 
Sawyers: So these are just the one a day? 
Jensen: Uh hum. And this is what I would suggest you starting with. Uh. 
I'm a little bit concerned that you function properly. Okay. 
Sawyers: Yeah. I do want. 
Jensen: So. Uh. It suggests these need to be taken late morning. I think 
you can gauge when you take them. I would start out initially at 
say eight o'clock. I'd eat a little bit of food with it because I think 
it can upset your stomach a little bit. Uh. And you can tell when 
these wear off. With me, they wear off right about eight o'clock 
and I just like my battery had run out. 
Sawyers: Uh huh. You mean eight o'clock in the morning. Take it at eight 
o'clock in the morning. 
Jensen: Yeah. About eight o'clock at night is when I would notice this, 
this feeling, okay. 
Sawyers: Oh. Okay. 
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Jensen: Okay. I need to tell this to you just because I think it may be an 
issue with your work. But, the, the time capsule itself is like a 
Contact time capsule and say it ran out and you were in the 
middle of something and this is like ruining things. You can 
actually take a small amount of the capsule and bite it and at that 
moment you get that effect. It is technically a way of abusing 
these, okay. Uh. And it could be dangerous if you bit an entire 
capsule. Okay. But it is one way of breaking that time release 













You don't automatically have. 
Yeah. 
Okay. That could be a problem. 
Yes. Because normally what I did in the morning, I would take it. 
I would grind some of that. I would wake right up and just go. 
You know, and I actually threw my last prescription away just 
because of the way I live. The way I think. I'm just compulsive. 
And you stop, you know, this isn't good for me right now. I'm 
not really uh losing more weight than I want to and this is giving 
me energy. I'm just going to abuse. 
So, if I start to crash, just take a pill and bite on it? 
You would actually take the capsule, open it up, and then put just 
a. You can sometimes go like that. 
Oh. The granules, pebbles, okay. 
You can just bite them. Ideally you wouldn't get in a situation 
where you need to do that. You could take caffeine on top of this 
if you needed to. Okay. 
Well, hopefully I could figure out a schedule that won't. 
Yes. 
You think in the morning is better. 




Jensen: But that's not when I took them. I would take them at about 
eight. Uh. (Pause). These come in a uh generic form and I would 
suggest getting a brand name. 
Sawyers: It is that much different? 
Jensen: Uh. In this case I think it is. Okay. And I need to look up 
Pondimin because that is just not something that I use a lot. To 
get everything straight. 
Sawyers: Fastin is, that's what the doctors use it for is for weight loss? 
Jensen: Yeah. That's what it is made for. 
(Long pause in tape). 
Jensen: Uh. Do you know how these things have worked for Lisa? 
Sawyers: I don't. I don't know. I haven't asked Geoff. I should ask him. 
I only met her once. She doesn't look like she needs to lose much 
weight to me, but. 
Jensen: Uh. In the hips. She is a little hip heavy. She dresses right. 
(Pause). Pondimin is difficult to find right now. Fastin, probably 
not. Uh. You can find Pondimin. If you choose to fill the 
Pondimin, I'd give yourself ten days at least before you. 
Sawyers: So. Then if I fill this one, I take it in combination. 
Jensen: Yes. 
Sawyers: Just once a day. 
Jensen: Interestingly, legally you take both of these in combination for 
three months which I think is pretty generous by the DEA. So. 
Uh. Its been approved and so uh. 
Sawyers: So, its the same, its just a different kind of amphetamine. 
Jensen: Yes. Uh. One way of thinking about it is like uh Ibuprofen, 
Naproxin, Naprosin are sister drugs. They are related to aspirin. 
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Sawyers: Just some work better for different people or something? 
Jensen: Uh hum. Pondimin is sugar acting. This is a long acting 
. These are tablets. So these will only work say 
maybe two to four hours. Let's see what the half life is. Twenty 
hours it says. Uh. Let's see. Uh. That's a metabolize two to 
four hours. So. Uh. You know, average it out to three hours. 
So. 
(Pause). 
(Tape ends). 
-9-
